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LABOR COST REVIEW PANEL

GREATER NEW YORK HEALTH CARE FACILITIES
ASSOCIATION
/
on behalf of MAPLE LEAF NURSING HOME,
NEW ROCHELLE NURSING HOME, GREEN PARK
CARE CENTER, CONCOURSE NURSING HOME

AWARD

and

STATE OF NEW YORK

Because of the severe economic problems of the above-named Homes and
facilities and pending further study of the record by the Panel

and a fi***

determination of the hardship appeals of said Homes and facilities, the
State is directed to increase the labor cost component of the Medicaid
reimbursement rates of said Homes and facilities in the amounts of and
pursuant to the methodology submitted by the State in the hearings before
this Panel on said hardship appeals, for the period April

1, 1979

through December 31, 1979.

Eric J. Schmertz,
Chairman
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

ss.

On this ^^^ day of /*(&,*, •
v before me personally came and
appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and '<nown Co me to be the i n d i v i d u a l
described in and who executed the foregoinq i
to me that'he executed the same.

Commission Ex?^/-""-

f

DATED:

-Rartholomsw J. Lawson

Concurring

)S5

STATE" OF

COUNTY OF

)
jA f'f}

t\ t-Klc

of

(/ &

before me oersonBlIY cane and

\iam

Gormley,

Dissenting
Concurring

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

'

1979
) ss.:
)

•

On this
day of
before me personally came
and appeared W i l l i a m Gormley to me known and- known to me to be the
Individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

I

LABOR COST REVIEW PANEL

LA A** r
C8EATES NEW YORK HEALTH CARE FACILITIES ASSOCIATION
AWARD

00 behalf of EAST HAVEN HEALTH RELATED FACILITY

j

and
STATE OF NEW YORK

-X
Pursuant to stipulation and as the only exception to the Panel's
foreclosure of consideration of fringe benefit costs re the year 1979,
and because of the severe economic difficulties of East Haven Nursing Home,
And pending.a final determination on the hardship appeal of said Home,
-.the State is directed to apply its methodoigy to the labor costs including
the fringe benefits of said Home for the period April 1, 1979 through
December 31, 1979, and to increase the labor cost .component of the Medicaid
reimbursement rate of and for said Home in the amount, if any, resulting
from the application of said methodology in the.manner and for the purpose
•et forth above.

Eric J./Schmertz,
Chairman
"^"----JEFFREY R. CORN
Notary Public, State of NetfTYork
• No.

)ss.:

STATE OF
COUNTY OF

Commission Expires Ma.-uii 30i i978

before me personally came and

On this 2 7^ day of
Wll

.
.
.
.. *

- i

--

,

3Q-46-24S38

Qualified in :va#gc-' County

~ -

appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to ma to be the i n d i v i d u a l
described in and who executed the foreqoinq i nt «/0
r MA^ t ancbhe , ac'^ncwledccd
I / /
^

to me that he executed the 5a~c.

JEFFREY R.

Notary Public, State of hievyf/pr
No. 30-46-24592
'Oualifiad in Nassii
Commission Expires Ma.^h 30. !

Bartholomew J. Lawson
Concurring
\:

}ss

•STATE
COUHTY

dav of
*''
before me personally came and
a o p e a r e d r Lwson
I ml known and known to me to be the -dividual
described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
_,

_

(__ _____ .,..^-,J

«.l,0

cai-u*

/ .' '

/••

Wi1!lam Gormley,
Dissenting
Concurring

DATED:

1070

STATE OF

) :;.

COUNTY OF

\

On this
day of
before me personally came
and appeared W i l l i a m Gormley to me known and known to me to be the
I n d i v i d u a l described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

*,t

LABOR COST REVIEW PANEL

-X
GREATER NEW YORK HEALTH CARE FACILITIES
ASSOCIATION

on behalf of SURFSIDE NURSING HOME

AWARD

-andSTATE OF NEW YORK

-X

Because of the severe economic problems of the above-named facility
and pending further study of the record by the Panel and a final determination of the hardship appeals of said facility, the State is directed
to increase the labor cost component of the Medicaid reimbursement

rates

of said facility in the amounts of and pursuant to the methodology submitted by the State in hearings before this panel on said harship appeals,
for the period April 1, 1980 through December 31, 1980.

Eric J. Schtnertz
Chairman

,

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

'JM

)ss.
)

I
I
*
0 /•*« I -s*. '
On this I
J
day of jy*^»/*«*
l'*v
z<"
before me personally came and
appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the individual
described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.

I

>•% , *

1 . **^V

r>0 I 3/Je/

( Bartholomew J. Lawson
Concurring
DATED:
"'
STATE OF I
COUNTY OF

)ss.
)

On this l-J
day of • jZ -/>/ e ~*
before me personally came and
appeared Bart Lawson to me known and known to me to be the individual
described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.

Concurring

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

/„'/,
)ss.

)

On this
' "*
day of-J^/>/e^ "*" '
before me personally came and
appeared William Gormley to me known and known to me to be the individual
described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.

^WiJ-L

.LVLJVX1JW

GREATER NEW YORK HEALTH CARE FACILITIES
ASSOCIATION
~
- ; --- ••'-•-'•

I

on behalf of NEW ROCHELLE NURSING-HOME

AWARD

-and-

STATE OF NEW YORK

-X

Because of the severe economic problems of the above-named facility
and pending further study of the record by the Panel and a final determination of the hardship appeals of said facility, the State is directed
to increase the labor cost component of the Medicaid reimbursement rates
of said facility in the amounts of .and pursuant to the methodology submitted by!the State in hearings before this panel on said harship appeals,
for the period April 1, 1980 through December 31, 1980.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman /

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

)ss.
)

On this |J
day of •£"/*'*", /T*^ before me personally came and
appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the individual
described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.

Bartholomew J. Lawson
Concurring
DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

)ss.
)

On this P
day of .Ay/««^ '^^° before me personally came and
appeared Bart Lawson to me known and known to me to be the individual
described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and.he acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.

C O >» *H f £X

C * p n- 1 J- - 3

Concurring

DATED:
,.
STATE OF N<*>
r
I
COUNTY OF A/«-- V'-'^

>ss-:
)

On this lJ '
day of -^/^^^ " ^ before me personally came and
appeared William Gormley to me known and known to me to be the individual
described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
to.me that he executed the same.

LABOR COST REVIEW PANEL

In the Matter of the Petition
between
GREATER NEW YORK HEALTH CARE
FACILITIES ASSOCIATION, INC. on
behalf of HILLSIDE MANOR and
THE STATE OF NEW YORK

INTERIM AWARD

THE UNDERSIGNED PANEL MEMBERS recognize the present severe
economic problems of the above named facility.

Therefore, without

prejudice to the positions of the State and the facility, the State
is directed to apply its methodology

to and for the periods July

through December 1979 and January through December 1980 to said

v

facility for determination of the labor cost component of said f a c i l i ties medicaid reimbursement rate for said periods.

If as a result

the facility is non-affordable for those periods the State shall
increase the labor cost component of the medicaid reimbursement rate
applicable to said f a c i l i t y for those periods, subject to a final
determination by this panel on the question of affordabi1ity pursuant
to the positions and rights of the parties as presented in the hearings
before the panel.

It should be recognized that such final determination

may affirm, reverse, modify, increase or decrease the labor cost component
of the medicaid reimbursement rate a p p l i c a b l e to this facility for whatever periods of time are properly before the panel in the full case pending before it.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chai rman

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

7
MELA

)ss,

Ar'JflR

Notary P'-D' '
,i. Bounty
Mar. 30, I9t

V

On this
day of October, 1980 before me personally came and
appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the i n d i v i d u a l
described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.

.-w York

--.:j •''...:miy ,,0

Bartholomew j. Lawson
Concurring

Jon txpirss iiai. 3>y, :

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

.

i

f

) ss.:
)

On this
day of
before me personally came and
appeared Bart Lawson to me known and known to me to be the i n d i v i d u a l
described'.in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

W i 1 1 i a m Gormley
Dissenting
Concurring
DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

)
) ss.

On this

day of

before me personally

came and appeared W i l l i a m Gormley to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument
and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

LABOR COST REVIEW PANEL

In the Matter of the Petition
between
GREATER NEW YORK HEALTH CARE
FACILITIES ASSOCIATION, INC. on
behalf of HILLSIDE MANOR and
THE STATE OF NEW YORK

INTERIM AWARD

THE UNDERSIGNED PANEL MEMBERS recognize the present severe
economic problems of the above named facility.

Therefore, without

prejudice to the positions of the State and the facility, the State
is directed to apply its methodology to and for the periods July
through December 1979 and January through December 1980 to said

v

facility for determination of the labor cost component of said facilities medicaid reimbursement rate for said periods.

If as a result

the facility is non-affordable for those periods the State shall
increase the labor cost component of the medicaid reimbursement rate
applicable to said facility for those periods, subject to a final
determination by this panel on the question of affordabi1ity pursuant
to the positions and rights of the parties as presented in the hearings
before the panel.

It should be recognized that such final determination

may affirm, reverse, modify, increase or decrease the labor cost component
of the medicaid reimbursement rate applicable to this facility for whatever periods of time are properly before the panel in the full case pending before it.

L -<-• 'Eric J. Schmertz
Chai rman
DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

)ss

I
Notary P

Bounty
. 30,

V

On this
day of October, 1980 before me personally came and
appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the individual
described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.

No;..,, i -.

r

..._

,-„• York

7-

/

«„<,!.•-.,Jw
-:. .a ': ,rary
m Expires Kar.3U,i9JU''

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

Bartholomew j.
Qbncurring J

Lawson

) ss.:
)

On this
day of
before me personally came and
appeared Bart Lawson to me known and known to me to be the i n d i v i d u a l
described'.in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

W i 1 1 i a m Gormley
Di ssent ing
Concurring
DATED:
STATE OF

)

COUNTY OF

) ss,
On this

day of

before me personally

came and appeared W i l l i a m Gormley to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument
and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

LABOR COST REVIEW PANEL

In the Matter of the Petition
between
GREATER NEW YORK HEALTH CARE
F A C I L I T I E S ASSOCIATION, INC. on
behalf of H I L L S I D E MANOR and
THE STATE OF NEW YORK

INTERIM AWARD

THE UNDERSIGNED PANEL MEMBERS recognize the present severe
economic problems of the above named facility.

Therefore, without

prejudice to the positions of the State and the f a c i l i t y , the State
is directed to apply its methodology

to and for the periods July

through December 1979 and January through December 1980 to said

>••

f a c i l i t y for determination of the labor cost component of said f a c i l i ties medicaid reimbursement rate for said periods.

If as a result

the facility is non-affordable for those periods the State shall
increase the labor cost component of the medicaid reimbursement rate
applicable to sa'id f a c i l i t y for those periods, subject to a final
determination by t h i s panel on the question of affordabi1ity pursuant
to the positions and rights of the parties as presented in the hearings
before the panel.

It should be recognized

that such final determination

may affirm, reverse, modify, increase or decrease the labor cost component
of the medicaid reimbursement rate applicable to this f a c i l i t y for whatever periods of time are properly before the panel in the f u l l case pending before it.

6 C *.

Eric
S'chmertz
•ic J. Schi
Chai rman

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

>ss,

7i

MEL
Notary !"-

v YoA
, . .... v^ouoty
, Mar. 30,

On this
day of October, 1980 before me personally came and
appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the i n d i v i d u a l
described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.
f
' !

Now.-; ,_..
Qualify..

,.., York'

/

.--

f

/

.u,.-.j Ca n ty

A

Bartholomew J. Lawson

Bmnision Expires Ma*. 3U.WJW-

Concurring

/

DATED:

STATE OF
COUNTY OF

.

) ss.:
)

On this
day of
before me personally came and
appeared Bart Lawson to me known and known to me to be the individual
described'.in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

W i 1 1 i a m Gormley
Di ssent i ng
Concurring
DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

)
) ss.:
On this

day of

before me personally

came and appeared W i l l i a m Gormley to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument
and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Utility Workers Union of America,
AFL-CIO, Local 393

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1730 0208 78

and
Suffolk County Water Authority

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Employer violate the contract by
failing to award the Meter Mechanic Grade
I position posted on February 27, 1978 to
George Schmidt? If so what shall be the
remedy ?
A hearing was held on November 13, 1979 at which time Mr.
Schmidt, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant", and representatives of the above named Union and Employer appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The parties

filed post-hearing briefs.
At the time he bid for the Grade I Meter Mechanic job the
grievant was an Apprentice Meter Mechanic.

The Company rejected

his bid, and awarded the job to Tommy Kusumotono, a less senior
employee who had progressed to the position of Meter Mechanic Grade II.

Both the grievant and Kusumotono had previously served

the full requisite period of time as Helper in the Meter Department .
There are two basic questions in this case.

First, whether

-2-

an incumbency in the job of Meter Mechanic - Grade II is a prerequisite for promotion to Meter Mechanic - Grade I; and second,
whether the Company's denial of the grievant's bid was arbitrary
or capricious within the meaning of Article V Section 7 of the
contract and the Award of this Arbitrator of December 2, 1975 in
Case #1330 0716 75.
With regard to the first question, the pertinent part of
Schedule I of the contract reads:
Note (i)-Meter Mechanic-Grade I shall be
entitled to an additional 5^ per hour after
three (3) years of satisfactory service in
this classification, and an additional 5(^
per hour after five (5) years of satisfactory
service.
Note (j)-Apprentice Meter Mechanic after one
(1) year of satisfactory service to the Authority
shall be entitled to an additional 5^ per hour,
and after one and one-half (1%) years of satisfactory service to the Authority in this classification shall be entitled to classification
of Meter Mechanic-Grade II. Such amount shall
be in addition to the hourly rates specified
hereinabove for this job classification.
Note (k)-Helper in the Meter Department shall
be entitled to an additional 5i per hour after
six (6) months of satisfactory service to the
Authority in this classification, and after one
(1) year shall become an Apprentice Meter
Mechanic.
If after one (1) year the position
is vacated, it will revert to the position of
Helper.
Ordinary logic suggests that promotions within the Meter
Department from the lowest position of Helper, to the ultimate
and highest position of Meter Mechanic-Grade I, are hierarchal,
moving sequentially through each higher paying job; i.e. from

-3Helper to Apprentice Meter Mechanic; to Meter Mechanic-Grade II
and then to Meter Mechanic-Grade I.

On that basis, service as

a Meter Mechanic-Grade II would be necessary to qualify for the
Grade I job.
But any prima facie logical view must be supported by the
contract.

The Union calls attention to the fact that the fore-

going contract language sets forth specific time limits for
progression from Helper to Apprentice Meter Mechanic and from
Apprentice Meter Mechanic to Meter Mechanic-Grade II, but does
not specify service as a Meter Mechanic-Grade II as a condition
precedent to the classification and pay of Meter Mechanic-Grade I.
The Union concludes therefore, that while service as a Helper
may be necessary to qualify for the Apprentice job; and service
as an Apprentice may be required before promotion to the Grade II
Meter Mechanic, there is no contract bar to promotion to Grade I
Meter Mechanic from the Apprentice level provided the bidder is
qualified.
Moreover the Union asserts that the progressions referred
to in the foregoing contract provisions, particularly the
progression from Apprentice to Meter Mechanic-Grade II, are not
based on differences in skills or significant differences in job
duties, but rather were negotiated to provide pay increases and
monetary incentives to employees to remain in the Meter Department
and that substantively there are no significant job distinctions

-4or differences in skills between the Apprentice and the Grade II
Meter Mechanic.
I do not interpret the foregoing sections that way, and it
is to the contract language that the arbitrator is bound.

Un-

disputedly there are four distinct job classifications in the
Meter Department, namely Helper, Apprentice Meter Mechanic, Meter
Mechanic-Grade II and Meter Mechanic-Grade I.

Progressively,

each, after a requisite period of service, carries with it a
higher rate of pay.

Any traditional interpretation of different

pay scales, which increase progressively with higher classified
jobs, establishes a strong presumption that the increased pay is
attendant to increased job duties, responsibilities, or required
skills.

Consequently unless rebutted, I find a contractual pre-

sumption, from the bare contract language, that there are
significant distinctions between the jobs of Apprentice Meter
Mechanic and Meter Mechanic-Grade II to justify the pay differences
Additionally besides any implicit requirement of step by
step progression within the cited jobs of the Meter Department
which may logically be drawn from the classification and pay
differences, I also find explicit language which bars an Apprentice
Meter Mechanic from jumping over the Meter Mechanic-Grade II
classification.in seeking promotion to Meter Mechanic-Grade I.
Paragraph (j) above provides that an Apprentice Meter
Mechanic
"....after one and one-half (1%) years of

-5satisfactory service to the Authority in
this classification shall be entitled to
classification of Meter Mechanic-Grade II."
(emphasis added)
To my mind this means that only after a year and one-half may an
Apprentice be promoted, and then only to Meter Mechanic-Grade II.
That interpretation bars the grievant on two grounds.

At

the time of his bid he had not yet completed one and one-half
years as an Apprentice, and of course, the promotion he sought
was not as paragraph (j) provides, to Grade II Meter Mechanic,
but rather to Grade I Meter Mechanic.
The Union's claim that the classification definitions between Apprentice and Meter Mechanic-Grade II were constructed
only to provide pay incentives and are not based on substantive
job differences, must be supported by evidence showing the duties
of both classifications to be substantially the same. The record
before me does not meet that test.

Though there is evidence

indicating that employees in bothclassifications perform many
overlapping functions and that the grievant knew about some of
the meter repair work primarily performed by the Grade II Mechanic
and even may be able to do that work if it was assigned to him, the
record before me shows that repairs of the larger meters are performed virtually exclusively by the Grade II Mechanics; are not
assigned to the Apprentice; and the work is carried out at
locations at which the Apprentice does not work.

Though the

grievant and the Union on his behalf claim that the grievant can
do the larger meter repair work - and there is evidence that this

-6may well be so - I am not able to hold that the two jobs are the
same or that the Company has made arbitrary distinctions
the two.

between

In short, even if the grievant is able to perform the

duties of the higher classification, that does not mean that the
two classifications involved are substantively one.
Finally, because of the contractual restrictions of
Schedule I, paragraphs (i),

(j) and (k), which accord an apprentice

Mechanic only the right to move upward from that classification to
Meter Mechanic-Grade II, the grievant's potential ability to do
those parts of the Grade II job which had not been assigned to him
as an Apprentice, (and to thereby be treated as if he occupied the
Grade II classification), is immaterial.

Hence, the Employer's

determinations under those circumstances cannot be deemed
arbitrary or capricious.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the arbitrator,
and having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
The Employer did not violate the contract
by failing to award the Meter MechanicGrade I position to George Schmidt.

DATE: January 29, 1980
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) " '

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this twenty-ninth day of January, 1980 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 144 - Division 100 SEIU, AFL-CIO
OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 1156 79

and
Supreme Building Maintenance Corporation

The stipulated issue is:
Were the layoffs of Marjoria Rand and
Rose Chimienti in violation of the
collective bargaining agreement? If so
what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association on December 18, 1979 at which time
Ms. Rand and Ms. Chimienti, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievants" and representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.
What the Union seeks in this case is beyond the provisions
of the collective bargaining agreement.

It claims that the

grievants, laid off from their jobs as matrons, should have
been allowed to bump less senior employees in the custodian
classification.

However the contract does not accord employees

bumping rights from one classification to another based on
seniority in layoff situations, nor does the contract determine

-2-

seniority on a company-wide basis.

Rather, Article IX Seniority

provides inter alia
"....seniority rights shall be exercised
....according to classifications."
It goes on to specify that the jobs of matron and custodian are,
among others, different job classifications and that
"In the event of a layoff employees shall
be laid off on the basis of seniority as
described above."
The phrase "as described above" refers to the previously
mentioned seniority by classification and the job distinction
between matron and custodian.
Accordingly under the contract the grievants acquired
seniority only within the classification of matron; were laid
off from that classification pursuant to their seniority, and
had no seniority or contract right to bump into the different
classification of custodian despite the fact that some custodians
had been employed by the Company a shorter period of time.
What the Union seeks in this proceeding is a matter of
collective bargaining, not arbitration.
The Undersigned, duly sworn, and having duly heard the
proofs and allegations of the above named parties, makes the
following AWARD:
The layoffs of Marjorie Rand and Rose Chimienti
were not in violation of the collective bargaining
agreement.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

-3-

DATED: January 17, 1980
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) '
On this seventeenth day of January, 1980 before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me
that he executed the same.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION

SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Petroleum Trades Employees Union, Inc.
OPINION AND AWARD
Case #79K 02681

and
Texaco, Inc.
New York City Sales Terminal

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company have proper cause pursuant
to Article X Paragraph E of the contract
to discharge Mr. Irving Jacobson? If not
what shall the remedy be?
A hearing was held at the Company offices in New York City
on December 17, 1979 at which time Mr. Jacobson, hereinafter
referred to as the grievant and representatives of the above
named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were offered

full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The parties filed post-hearing briefs.
On August 18, 1978 the grievant, then a fuel delivery driver,
negligently pumped 500 gallons of non-leaded premium gasoline into
a customer's tank reserved for and containing non-leaded regular
gasoline.

This "co-mingling" which was the grievant's fourth "co-

mingling" mistake over the last five years of his employment,
triggered his discharge.
It is undisputed that the grievant committed

"co-mingling"

mistakes on January 22, 1974, March 28, 1974 and July 19, 1976.

-2-

He was disciplined for these errors by disciplinary suspensions
of one day, three days and one day respectively.
The Union claims that the instant incident which resulted
in the grievant's discharge was not serious in that the co-mingled
product was not contaminated; the product was marketable by the
customer at only a minor monetary loss to the Company; that it
was not comparable to a serious co-mingling of leaded and nonleaded gasoline or the adding of regular gas to premium which
would contaminate the resultant product; that co-mingling is an
inherent probability of the job because of the large number and
quantities of deliveries made; that by practice co-mingling errors
only brought penalties of from one to three days suspensions at
most; and that therefore the penalty of discharge imposed on the
grievant was too severe.
The Company relies on its application of "progressive
discipline" for those similar prior offenses committed by the
grievant together with the fact that on earlier discharge of
the grievant for a delivery "spill" and for using intemperate
language to a supervisor was reduced to a disciplinary suspension
by an arbitrator who reinstated the grievant with "a last chance
to prove himself."

The Company asserts that the instant offense,

occurring less than five months thereafter, constitutes a default
by the grievant on the last chance condition imposed by the prior
arbitrator.

The Company asserts therefore that based on the

grievant's entire record including the last co-mingling mistake,

-3-

his discharge was for cause.
Though I think an extended disciplinary suspension would
have been adequate in this case, I cannot find that the Company's
decision to impose the penalty of discharge was improper.
This was the grievant's fourth similar offense.

By the

application of progressive discipline, the grievant was put on
notice that co-mingling was neither an incidental nor acceptable
part of carrying out fuel delivery duties.

That this latest

incident was not as serious as if leaded and non-leaded gas had
been mixed, or as if a regular blend had been mixed with premium,
is really immaterial.

As the fourth co-mingling incident it

must be construed as a clear indication of the grievant's propensity for negligence, and the Company has the right to protect
itself from further such incidents, serious or less serious.

In

short I am not persuaded that the Company is required to await
a more serious co-mingling by the grievant of leaded and nonleaded gas, or of premium pumped into regular tanks, before it
can terminate the grievant's employment.
The Union's claim that only short periods of suspensions
have been imposed as discipline for co-mingling mistakes has not
been shown to be applicable to circumstances similar to this case.
The fact is that warnings and suspensions are and have been the
proper penalty for first or second offenses, but where as here,
a fourth offense has occurred following disciplinary suspensions
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for earlier acts, a greater penalty is proper and appropriate.
Otherwise the Company could never discharge an employee for
repeated co-mingling mistakes, but would have to tolerate his
continued employment indefinitely.
circumstance

The illogic of any such

is manifest.

The Union asserts that previously no employee has been
discharged for co-mingling.

What would be material in support

of that assertion are examples of other employees with prior
disciplinary records similar to that of the grievant, more
particularly employees with at least three prior incidents of
co-mingling over a similar or relevant period of time, who were
not dismissed.

The Union has now shown that essential compar-

ability to support its contention that the penalty of discharge
imposed on the grievant was either excessive or discriminatory.
Considering the foregoing I find that I need not deal with
the decision of Arbitrator Benjamin C. Wolf which reduced the
grievant's prior discharge to a suspension.

Needless to say I

do not see how any analysis or consideration of that decision
(which dealt with a spill rather than a co-mingling and also dealt
with the grievant's insubordination under the particular circumstances of that situation) could be helpful to the grievant's
case herein.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
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parties makes the following AWARD:

The Company had proper cause to discharge
Irving Jacobson.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: April 11, 1980
STATE OF New York )gc
COUNTY OF New York )
On this eleventh day of April, 1980 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATION

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO, Local Union 8793

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #12 20 0236 80

and
Thinsheet Metals Company

In accordance with Article XI of the collective bargaining
agreement dated September 4, 1979 between the above named Union
and Company, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to
hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Was the suspension of Alger Ambrose in violation of Article V Section 4(g) and the Preamble of the collective bargaining agreement
and/or an unfair labor practice under Section
8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended? If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Waterbury, Connecticut on July 9, 1980
at which time representatives of the Union and Company appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's

Oath was taken„
The Company claims that on January 14, 1980 it informed Mr.
Ambrose, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" or "Ambrose",
that production requirements would not permit certain union members
to attend, as planned witnesses, an arbitration hearing scheduled
for the next day, and further claims it directed the grievant to
rescind his instructions or not to instruct those employees to

-2attend as a group.

The Company imposed the suspension for the

grievant's failure to comply with that directive, asserting that
it constituted "insubordination."
The cited contract provisions read:
/_Preamble_/
. . .The provisions of this agreement constitute
the sole procedure for the processing and settlement of any claim by an employee or the Union of
a violation by the Company of this Agreement. As
the representative of the employees, the Union
may process complaints and grievances through the
the complain and grievance procedure, including
arbitration, in accordance with this Agreement or
adjust or settle the same.
ARTICLE V - RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PARTIES
Section 4. In addition to the responsibilities
that may be provided elsewhere in this Agreement,
the following shall be observed:
• • ••

(g) There shall be no discrimination, restraint
or coercion against any employee because of membership in the Union.
The Company contends that contrary to its instructions to him,
the grievant told eight employees to attend the arbitration hearing during their regular working hours.

The Company asserts that

it made clear that it would be willing to permit two employees at
a time to attend the arbitration hearing and after those two had
finished testifying they could be replaced by two others, continuing the process until all the proposed union witnesses had testified.

The arbitration hearing was to be held at a motel approx-

imately five minutes in travel time from the Company's plant.

The

Company points out that only three employees of the eight who
attended the arbitration hearing testified. The five others "just
sat there."

This, argues the Company resulted in an unnecessary

-3loss of production.

It insists it did not try to deny the Union

"access to the collective bargaining process", rather, it's objection was to the simultaneous presence of all witnesses at the
hearing.

It sought only to accommodate its production needs with

the arbitration hearing, and did not seek to preclude any testimony by any witness.

The seven employees other than the grievant

were given disciplinary warnings which the Union did not grieve.
The Union contends that there is a history of anti-union
animus on the part of the Company and that the Company has committed unfair labor practices on previous occasions.

The Union

stresses that this is a new Local that has negotiated its first
collective bargaining agreement and that this disciplinary suspension prompted the first grievance filed and the first arbitration between the parties under that contract.
The Union argues that it must have the right and the ability
to process arbitration cases as a means of settling grievances,
and that how it plans its case and particularly which witnesses
are needed are matters exclusively

for the Union to determine.

As

the Union's attorney concluded that it was necessary to have eight
employees as witnesses present at the hearing, the Union insists
that any limitation by the Company on the right of the Union to
call those witnesses and have them present even during working
hours unreasonably impedes the traditional use of the grievance
procedure.

The Union points out that the Company did not order

the employees personally or individually not to attend the hearing

-4as a group, but instead held the grievant, as president of the
Local, responsible.
In the Union's view the time frame during which the Company
informed the grievant regarding the limits on the number of
witnesses to be present at the hearing, is significant.

The

Union maintains that the Company first approached the grievant
as late as five minutes before quitting time the day before the
hearing, and failed to contact the Union's international representative, John R. Giamette about the matter.

By that time the

Union states, the eight employees who were directly involved in
the grievance to be arbitrated or who had attended the negotiation
sessions regarding the disputed contract language of that grievance had been interviewed by Union counsel, selected as witnesses,
and told by the Union to be present at the hearing.

The Union

claims that the Company's effort to restrict the number of witnesses to be present at the hearing came too late and that the
Union did not intend to impair production or otherwise harm the
Company.
The facts of the case indicate that at approximately five
minutes before quitting time on January 14, 1980 the Personnel
Director, Wayne Rigney, approached the grievant and stated that
the absences of eight employees from the plant simultaneously
would adversely affect productivity; that management could authorize two employees to be absent at a time; and that when additional
witnesses were needed they could be brought to the site of the
hearing, approximately five minutes from the plant.

Rigney

-5-

testified that the grievant rejected this suggestion, saying,
"go to hell, your're not going to tell us what to do."

Rigney

subsequently stated that, "if all eight employees go, there may
be disciplinary action."

The grievant then warned that if there

were disciplinary action he would close the plant down.
that preceded this exchange are important.

The events

Ambrose testified that

he and Union Representative John R. Giamette, decided who would
be needed at the hearing two or three days earlier.

A meeting

between the selected employees, and the Union's attorney, Joseph
Garrison, was planned for 3:30 PM on January 14, 1980.

At 9:00 AM

on January 14 Giamette asked Rigney to release those eight employees for the meeting.
did not do so.

Rigney was to respond to this request but

Giamette was unable to reach Mr. Rigney to obtain

permission for the release of the employees from work for the
planned meeting on January 14, so as a result Giamette rescheduled
the preliminary meeting for 7:00 PM.

Ambrose notified the employ-

ees and also told them to attend the arbitration hearing at 10:00
AM the following morning.
The conflicting interests of the parties are obvious, and both
interests are legitimate.

The Union was properly concerned with

the adequate preparation and presentation of its arbitration case.
The Company sought to

minimize the impact on its production.

The

Company has established as a matter of evidence that the absence
of the eight employees from the plant during working hours diminished productivity that day.

The Union was not unmindful or in-

sensitive to the Company's production needs.

Thus, it changed

its original prehearing conference between its attorney and the

-6prospective witnesses from the afternoon of January 14 to 7 PM
that day after working hours, when consent for them to leave the
plant at the earlier hour was not forthcoming.

I conclude that

the Company did not seek to unreasonably interfere with the Union's
arbitration rights, but only sought to establish a sequence of
witnesses who could be shuttled from the plant to the hearing site
at a minimum loss of their respective working time.
It is well settled that employees and union officials must
carry out the instructions of management exercising managerial
authority even if those instructions are violative of the collective bargaining agreement, subject to certain special exceptions
not present in this case, and subject to the right of the union
to grieve and arbitrate.

However, based on the factual circum-

stances of this case, Rigney's instruction to the grievant about
the attendance of the eight employees at the hearing did not constitute an "exercise of management authority" within the traditional employer-employee relationship to which this rule applies.
The exchange between them did not primarily involve a work assignment or the carrying out of the Company's right to direct the work
force in the manufacturing and/or service activities of the
Company.

Rather and primarily, it related to the institutional

labor-management relationship between the parties and particularly
the

implementation of the terminal step of the grievance procedure

In that respect, and restricted to that situation I deem that the
Union President was on an equal footing with management.

He was

not required, virtually at the "eleventh hour", to accede to the
Company's procedure for the conduct of the Union's case at the

-7arbitration, especially where as here the methods planned by the
Union were neither unusual or unreasonable as a matter of arbitration practice.

Nor, as the Company apparently tried to do here, is

the Union president the Company's "agent" in delivering messages
to other employees who are union members regarding the manner in
which they were to give testimony on behalf of the Union at the
arbitration hearing, especially when as here, that "message" was
at variance with the usual method for the exercise of a union's
arbitration rights.

In short, despite the Company's legitimate

objective, it had no proper basis under the circumstances of this
case to treat as insubordination the Union president's refusal to
alter the way Union representatives and counsel planned the Union's
arbitration case.

The grievant's argumentative or even threaten-

ing language to Rigney, though not condoned, was in my view an
angry response to the late effort by the Company to cast the way
the Union was to present its arbitration case, and inasmuch as
there is no evidence of any plan or action to "shut-down the
plant", the bare language used by the grievant was within the
bounds of zealous union representation.
The rules of the American Arbitration Association which by
contract are binding on the parties at the arbitration level are
supportive of the Union's case herein.

Rule 22 of the Voluntary

Labor Arbitration Rules provides:
Attendance at Hearings--Persons having a direct
interest in the arbitration are entitled to
attend hearings. The Arbitrator shall have the
power to require the retirement of any witness
or witnesses during the testimony of other witnesses . It shall be discretionary with the
Arbitrator to determine the propriety of the
attendance of any other persons.

-8That Rule is incorporated into the Agreement negotiated by
the parties under Article XI - Arbitration.

That Article states:

"Arbitration shall be conducted under the Voluntary Labor Arbitration Rules then obtaining of the American Arbitration Association."
Thus, any person having a "direct interest" in the arbitration
has a right to attend the hearing.
In addition, Rule 28 of the Voluntary Labor Arbitration Rules
provides in pertinent part:
Evidence — The parties may offer such evidence
as they desire and shall produce such additional evidence as the Arbitrator may deem necessary
to an understanding and determination of the dispute. When the Arbitrator is authorized by law
to subpoena witnesses and documents, he may do so
upon his own initiative or upon the request of any
party....
It is therefore cleat: that at the January 15, 1980 hearing both
parties had the right to produce whatever evidence and testimony
deemed by the Arbitrator to be relevant and material to the dispute and that persons having a direct interest in the arbitration
were entitled to attend the hearing.
Article XI, Section 3 of the Agreement specifically envisions
that employees will attend arbitration hearings during working
hours.

Section 3 provides in pertinent part that:

"All lost time,

wages or expenses of witnesses or other participants called by the
Union shall be paid by the Union and all of the same expenses incurred by the Company shall be paid by the Company."

It is note-

worthy that the Agreement is silent with respect to any further
guidelines for the attendance of witnesses to arbitration

hearings.

Under these circumstances in which the Agreement is silent, a

-9reasonable standard must be presumed to apply.
To hold the grievant responsible for the action he took in
his role as union president would be unreasonable under those
circumstances.

In view of the foregoing Rules of the American

Arbitration Association, the explicit incorporation of those Rules
in the collective bargaining agreement and the Company's delay
until virtually the last minute to set forth its position regarding the attendance of witnesses at the hearing, the grievant's
action, in his capacity as president of the Union was neither
surprising, illogical or unreasonable.
concerned he was not insubordinate.

So far as this case is

I find he acted primarily on

the determinations of Union counsel who had decided that all eight
employees were needed to testify and should be present at the
hearing as a group.

Considering the traditional arbitration

hearing, which often involves many witnesses and where more often
than not all witnesses are present at the same time, I cannot
find the plan of Union counsel to be unorthodox or unreasonable.
And the grievant's implementation of that plan, as the Union
official responsible for the processing of the grievance through
arbitration, was a reasonable reflection of what the Union thought
was necessary to properly present its case.

Though only three of

the eight employees actually testified is not evidence of bad
faith.

It is not unusual to have persons in attendance who are

planned as witnesses but who subsequently or in the course of the
hearing are not called.

There is no evidence that the grievant

knew that some of them would not be used as witnesses the next day,
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when on January 14th at 5:20 FM he resisted management's directive to stagger the appearance and testimony of the Union's witv

nesses .
Accordingly the grievant was not guilty of insubordination
and his three day suspension is reversed.
The Alleged Unfair Labor Practice
CONTENTIONS OF THE UNION
The Union argues that the Company violated Section 8(a)(3)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, when the Company
suspended Ambrose.

The Union claims that the employer's action

coerced and intimidated the employees under Section 7 of the Act
with respect to their exercise of concerted activity by disciplining eight employees for participating in the grievance procedure.
The instant arbitration only concerns Ambrose.

The Union further

argues that the Company has a history of anti-union animus.
CONTENTIONS OF THE COMPANY
The Company denies the claim that it committed an unfair
labor practice.

It contends that the disciplinary action was not

taken for union activity but rather for insubordination.

The

Company maintains that the grievant's action did not constitute
protected activity within the meaning of the Act but was instead
designed to usurp the authority of the Company.
DISCUSSION
The National Labor Relations Act, as amended, provides in
Section 8(a) that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer--

by discrimination in regard to hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization....
The parties expressly stipulated that this Arbitrator should
determine whether the suspension of Ambrose violated the abovequoted provision.
Section 8(a)(3) specifically requires that discrimination and
a resulting discouragement of union membership be found. American
Ship Building Co. v. Labor Board, 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965).

Al-

though Ambrose was President of the Union, I am of the view that
for purposes of the discipline meted out to him this status was
immaterial to the Company.

Rather, the Company would have disci-

plined any employee regardless of his status who had instructed
other employees not to report for work.
With respect to the necessity of proving that there was a
resulting discouragement of union membership, a three day disciplinary suspension in my opinion would have such an effect assuming, of course, that the discipline was due to the grievant's
position as President of the Union.
The critical aspect of the Section 8(a)(3) charge in the
instant case, however, is whether the Company harbored an antiunion motive, intent, or animus.

The Company sought to discipline

Ambrose for his "act of insubordination including the advising of
employees to take time

off without authorization." Accordingly,

the Company asserts that it acted for the legitimate business
reason of maintaining control over employee attendance, whereas
the Union argues that reason was pretextual and that the real
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reason for disciplining the grievant was its anti-union animus.
I conclude that the case of NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.
388 U.S. 26 (1967), is controlling.

The Court in Great Dane

summarized several principles that furnish the rubric for determining whether the elements for a Section 8(a)(3) charge are
proved when an employer alleges that legitimate business reasons
formed the basis for the employer's conduct:
First, if it can reasonably be concluded that
the employer's discriminatory conduct was "inherently destructive" of important employee
rights, no proof of an anti-union motivation
is needed and tine Board can find an unfair labor
practice even if the employer introduces evidence
that the conduct was motivated by business considerations. Second, if the adverse effect of the
discriminatory conduct on employee rights is
"comparatively slight," an anti-union motivation
must be proved to sustain the charge if the employer has come forward with evidence of legitimate and substantial business justifications for
the conduct. Thus, in either situation, once it
has been proved that the employer engaged in discriminatory conduct which could have adversely
affected employee rights to some extent, the
burden is upon the employer to establish that
he was motivated by legitimate objectives since
proof of motivation is most accessible to him.
NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967) See
also American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB 380 U.S, 300 (1965);
NLRB v. John Brown d/b/a Brown Food Stores, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
In applying these standards to the instant case, it is clear
to me that the sole motivating factor for the Company's action
was a belief that the grievant had acted insubordinately in advising certain employees to take time off from work to attend the
arbitration hearing.

The underlying reason for this action was

the Company's concern about minimizing loss of productivity due
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to the absence of the employees.

In my view this belief consti-

tuted a legitimate business objective even though the Company's
interpretation

and application of the collective bargaining agree-

ment was erroneous.

That the Company sustained its burden of

proof is based on the following facts.

First, the Company had

sought to limit the number of employees who would be absent from
the plant at any one time.

Second, the Company proved at the

instant hearing that the absence of eight employees would adversely
affect production at the plant.

Third, the Company's Personnel

Manager had sought to confer with the International Union Representative to enter into a mutually acceptable arrangement.
there was no proof of any

Fourth,

instance of anti-union animus on the

part of the Company beyond the Union's general assertion to that
effect.

Based upon the totality of these circumstances, it is my

opinion that the Company's action, albeit erroneous, was predicated
on a good faith belief that the grievant had acted insubordinately.
A case that has considered an analogous situation is Service
Employees International Union, Local 250, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 600
F.2d 930 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In that case, the District of Columbia
Circuit overruled the NLRB by sustaining an employer's discharge
of 13 employees who attended an NLRB representation hearing during working hours despite the express orders of the employer to
remain at work.

The court reasoned:

Bearing in mind that "working time is for work"
we agree with the dissent (Members Penello and
Walther of the NLRB) that, absent any subpoena
or call from the Board to attend a hearing
"unless employees can demonstrate substantial
reasons for attending a Board hearing, unless

-14there are compelling reasons urging their
attendance, the employer's right to maintain normal operations should, and does,
take precedence over the employees' right
to leave work during regular working hours
for such attendance or for any other purpose
except that of legitimate strike activity"
excluding, of course, an emergency with which
we are not concerned in this case.
Id. at 938. After distinguishing

the Service Employees case from

Great Dane — since the former involved a Section 8(a)(4) charge
and the latter concerned a Section 8(a)(3) charge—the District
of Columbia Circuit reached an important conclusion that in my
judgement applies to the Ambrose situation:
Bearing in mind that the employer in the
present case had volunteered to permit one
representative to attend the hearing, and
considering the nature of a Board representation hearing with its flexible alternatives
with respect to a witness testifying, it is
indeed difficult to find that the resulting
harm is anything more than de minimus. Assuredly,
the employer's conduct was prima facie lawful and,
we feel, convincingly so.
Id. at 939.
In the instant case I view the Company's offer to permit two
employees to attend the arbitration hearing, with the proviso
that additional employees would be shuttled to the hearing as
needed, as being analogous to the Service Employees case.

Thus

the harm to the rights of the employees did not even rise to the
level of "comparative slight."
Insofar as the Company's business interest is concerned, the
opinion of the District of Columbia Circuit, which adopted the
language of the dissenting NLRB Members, is particularly

noteworthy
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"The successful functioning of a business
enterprise requires, rather obviously, the
presence of employees on the job during
working hours. It would also seem equally
evident that employee absence is inherently
disruptive and unexcused absence has, of
course, usually been considered, absent a
legitimate strike, proper grounds for
discharge."
Id. at 940.

It is therefore my opinion that the Company's action

in disciplining Ambrose lacked an anti-union motive but was predictated upon a desire to maintain control over employee attendance .
Finally, the Second Circuit recently decided a Section 8(a)(3)
case that considers some of the problems that arise with respect
to motivation when a union activist is involved.

In Waterbury

Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90 (2d Cir 1978), the
court initally noted that: "it is well established that employees
who are active in union affairs do not thereby obtain a special
immunity from ordinary employment decisions." Id. at 97.

The

court thereafter continued by citing language from Mt. Healthy
City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1977),
to wit:
"A borderline or marginal candidate should not
have the employment question resolved against
him because of constitutionally protected conduct. But that same candidate ought not to be
able, by engaging in such conduct, to prevent
his employer from assessing his performance
record and reaching a decision not to rehire
on the basis of that record, simply because
the protected conduct makes the employer more
certain of the correctness of its decisions."
Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90, 99
(2d Cir. 1978).
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Based upon the Waterbury case I consider it beyond question
that standing alone, Ambrose's status as President of the Union
is not enough upon which to find that the Company violated Section
8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.

Accord-

ingly, based upon my view of the applicable law, it is my determination that the Company did not violate Section 8(a)(3) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, when it imposed a three
day suspension on Ambrose for his alleged "act of insubordination
including the advising of employees to take time off without
authorization."

As Article V Section 4(g) of the contract tracks

the aforementioned section of the National Labor Relations Act,
this determination is substantively dispositive of the Union's
claim that the suspension violated that contract provision.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and having
been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
Alger Ambrose was not insubordinate. To the
extent that the Company misconstrued his
legitimate role as the Union's President regarding the method for presentation of the
Union's case in an arbitration, it violated
the Preamble of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. The suspension is reversed and
Ambrose shall be made whole for the three
days loss of pay. However, the Company's
action neither violated Article V Section 4(g)
of the contract nor Section 8(a)(3) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: August 12, 1980

System Board of Adjustment
Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
AWARD
G-2-5/3-13A

and
International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
Mechanics and Related Employees

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
above named parties make

the following AWARD

The parties bilaterally agreed on a "four
hour rule" which constitutes an enforceable "side agreement" applicable to the
circumstances of the instant case.
The layoffs of the mechanics at Louisville,
Kentucky did not violate the contract.

••ft.
DATED: February 1, 1980
STATE OF New York ). oc
,
oS •
COUNTY OF New York )

Brit J. Schmertz
Chairman

On this first day of February, 1980, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same•MARSHA L STtiNHAfiDT
Notary Public, State of New Ypft

No. 24-4504976
Qualifijd in Kings County
Commission Expires Myrc1] :o, 193j

DATED: February
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1980

Nicholas Zinevich
Concurring

On this
day of February, 1980, before me personally came
and appeared Nicholas Zinevich to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
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Frank Score
Dissenting
DATED: February
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1980

On this
day of February, 1980 before me personally
came and appeared Frank Score to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

ER 1C J.

SCH M E R T Z

P. C.

CHANIN BUILDING

122 EAST 42ND STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. !OOi7

HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
HEMPSTEAD, NEW YORK II55O

(212. 6 8 2 - 6 9 8 O

(516) 5 6 O - 3 6 O 7

January 14, 1980

Herbert Prashker, Esq.
Poletti Freidin Prashker
Feldman & Gartner
1185 Avenue of The Americas
New York, New York 10036
William Jolley, Esq.
Jolley, Moran, Walsh,
Hager & Gordon
1300 Trader's National Bank Building
1125 Grand Avenue
Kansas City, Missouri 64106
RE: General Grievance
TWA - IAM
(Louisville Mechanics)
Gentlemen:
I regret that I have been unable to meet the
January 15th date for rendition of the Award in the above
matter.
May I have your agreement to an extension until
February 1, 1980?
Very truly yours,

Eric J
Arbitrator
EJS:hls
cc: Mr. Frank Score
Union Member, TWA-IAM System Board
of Adjustment and General Chairman
IAM District 142
400 N.E. East 32nd Street
Kansas City, Missouri 64116
Mr. Nicholas Zinevich, Company Member
TWA-IAM System Board of Adjustment
and Director Technical Services
Kansas City, Missouri 64195

System Board of Adjustment
Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
AWARD
G-2-5/3-13A

and
|;
!
lj

International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
Mechanics and Related Employees

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
above named parties make

the following AWARD

The parties bilaterally agreed on a "four
hour rule" which constitutes an enforceable "side agreement" applicable to the
circumstances of the instant case.
The layoffs of the mechanics at Louisville,
Kentucky did not violate the contract.

||
S]

DATED: February 1, 1980
STATE OF New York )sg
COUNTY OF New York )
On this first day of February, 1980, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
MARSHA L STEINHARDT
Notary Public, State of New 74*
Na. 244504976
Qualified in ^n.-: r .unty
Commission F ,
: 30

DATED: February
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1980

Nicholas Zinevich
Concurring

On this
day of February, 1980, before me personally came
and appeared Nicholas Zinevich to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
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Frank Score
Dissenting
DATED: February
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1980

On this
day of February, 1980 before me personally
came and appeared Frank Score to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

*.
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United Press International

The stipulated issue is:
Did United Press International violate Article
VIII, Article IX, Article X Section 2, Article
XVIII Section 6 and Article XX Section 2 of
the contract by compensating in cash employees
with holiday time owed at pro rata or overtime
salary rates lower than their current salaries?
If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association in New York City on December 6, 1979 at
which time representatives of the above named Union and Employer
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The parties

filed post-hearing briefs.
Article XX Section 2 provides in pertinent part:
An employee required to work on a holiday (or
the day officially observed), shall be compensated at the overtime rate (as provided in
Article VII, Overtime) in addition to her or
his regular weekly pay, or by mutual agreement
between the Employer and the employee by time
off at the rate of time and one-half.
If the latter procedure is followed, namely the utilization
of time off at the rate of time and one-half, it is referred to
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as "banking" the holiday for future time off.
This latter procedure, when applied to employees who are
actively employed on and after the "time off" is taken may result
in payment for the time off at time and one-half calculated on a
salary greater than the pay rate in existence at the time the
holiday actually took place.

This would happen when, between the

actual holiday and the later date when the employee takes time
off, there had been a general contractual wage increase.

In that

event the employee who elected and was granted the time off at
a time subsequent to the general wage increase would receive time
and one-half pay for that time off calculated on his higher regular
rate of pay resulting from the wage increase.

This circumstance,

as it applies and has been applied to "continuing" employees is
undisputed by and acceptable to the Union.
This dispute is limited to the circumstance where an employee
has worked on a holiday, has not been compensated for the holiday
at the overtime rate, has apparently deferred or planned to defer
payment to a later period when he would take time off, but before
the time off has been agreed upon or granted, or taken, that
employee is terminated or otherwise permanently leaves his job.
In that circumstance, where there had been a general wage increase
between the date of the holiday and the date of the employee's
termination or cessation of employment, the Employer has compensated that employee for working the holiday at the overtime rate

-3based on the employee's regular rate of pay in existence at the
time the holiday occurred.

This is what the Union objects to.

It contends that under this circumstance the terminated employee
or the employee who otherwise ceases his employment should receive
compensation for having worked the holiday at the overtime rate
based on his regular rate of pay which obtains at the time of his
termination or cessation of employment, in the same manner as it
would be paid to a "continuing" employee whose employment neither
terminated nor ceased.

The Union asserts that the Employer's

disparate methods of compensation between continuing employees on
one hand and those whose employment terminated on the other, is to
set up different pay scales for employees similarly situated (in
that both had worked the holiday and had deferred payment therefore until a later period when they would take time off) and that
such disparity is unjustified and untenable.
The fact that the Union does not object to a different pay
arrangement between the employee who is compensated for working
the holiday on or shortly after the holiday occurs, and the
employee who defers such compensation until he can take time off
later, under the circumstance where a general wage increase has
intervened, persuades me that the compensation involved is for
and attaches to two different events.

The former is payment for

the holiday worked; the latter is payment for time off.

Had both

been intended to be compensation only for the holiday worked, the

-4same amount of money should be accorded to the employee in both
circumstances, no matter when payment for working the holiday was
made, regardless of any intervening wage increase.
What then is the status of the employee who worked a holiday,
who chose not to take pay for working the holiday on or shortly
thereafter, and who is thereafter terminated or ceases his
employment?

It is apparent to me that unless before his termination

he had worked out a mutual agreement with the Employer for certain
specified time off, his termination or cessation of employment
ended any opportunity for further working time which he could
" take off" and for which he could be compensated based on his then
current rate of pay.

The contract requires that under the "bank-

ing" option, the employee may receive the subsequent time off by
mutual agreement between the Employer and the employee.

Upon

termination or other cessation of employment it becomes impossible
for the Employer and employee to mutually agree on a subsequent
time off.

Also, with the end of the employee's employment status,

there is no further work time available to him during which he can
take time off, let alone reach that mutual agreement.
However, because he worked the holiday, and because he was
not compensated for that work, the Employer remains obligated to
provide him with compensation for the holiday worked, but not for
any subsequent, (and unavailable) time off.

What the Employer has

done in that circumstance, and what I find not to be a violation
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of the contract, is to pay that employee the holiday pay which
he would have received for working the holiday.
Inasmuch as Article XX Section 2 does not specifically deal
with the instant disputed circumstance where a wage increase takes
place between the holiday worked and the date of an employee's
termination or cessation of employment, the well settled approach
is to look at the past practice.

Here, though the practice has

not been entirely uniform, it has been more consistently supportive
of the Employer's position than that of the Union.

I accept the

Union's assertion that it has been unaware of that practice until
recently, and that its recent awareness resulted in this grievance.
The point is however, that with the contract silent on what is to
be done under the disputed circumstance, and with the burden on
the Union to prove its grievance, the practice if not fully
supportive of the Employer's action, is certainly not determinative
in the Union's favor.

Hence the Union's grievance must fail.

With the foregoing holding I do not find that the Employer
violated Article X Section 2 of the contract, or any of the other
Articles and Sections set forth in the stipulated issue.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
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United Press International did not violate
any of the provisions of the contract by
compensating in cash employees with holiday
time owed at pro rata or overtime salary
rates lower than their current salaries.

Eric J./Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 27, 1980
STATE OF New York )ss.
COUNTY OF New York )
On this 27th day of March, 1980 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

HAROLD F. WASHINGTON
Notary P"h'ir:, State rf New York
No. 41-4507328
Qualified in Queens County C /
Commission Expires March 30,19,.* f
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University of Connecticut

The stipulated issue is:
Is the grievance arbitrable? If so
what shall be the disposition of the
Union's grievance dated November 26,
1979, marked as Joint Exhibit #7 in
the record?
A hearing was held at the University on August 12, 1980
at which time the grievant, Robert Loheyde, and representatives
of the above named University and Union appeared. All concerned
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Oath was duly administered.

The Arbitrator's

The parties filed post-hearing

briefs.
The Union claims violations of various provisions of Article
6 of the contract.

The subject matter of the grievance has an

arguable and reasonable relationship to certain sections of
Article 6, and disposition of the grievance requires interpretation of those sections.

Accordingly, under well settled rules,

the grievance is arbitrable.
The basic facts are not in dispute.

The grievant was em-

ployed as a probationary employee for a pre-determined one year
period December 27, 1978 through December 26, 1979.

His employ-
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ment was not renewed at the end of that period.

By determination

of the University, and over his objections, the grievant was
required to take his accumulated vacation during November and
December of 1979, the last two months of his employment term.
He claims he should have been permitted to take his vacation
after December 26, 1979; that under Article 6 he had the right
to receive that vacation entitlement subsequent to his one year
employment term in the form of a cash payment; that the
University's refusal to permit him to do so was violative of
cited sections of Article 6 of the contract.

As a remedy he

now seeks pay equivalent to the amount of his accumulated vacation.
The University asserts that in accordance with its managerial
authority it may schedule an employee's vacation in its discretion; that it selected the period during the grievant's last
two months of his employment because it was a slow time for his
department; that the dispute is substantively mooted because the
grievant received and was paid for his vacation during his employment and that to grant him the remedy he seeks would accord
him a second vacation payment as well as extend his employment
term beyond his one year contract.
I am not persuaded that any of the cited sections of
Article 6 are applicable to or dispositive of this dispute.
Section 6.la sets forth the number of days which a twelve month
employee may accumulate for vacation, but does not prescribe when
that vacation may be taken or be scheduled.
vides for the use of vacation accumulations

Section 6.1c pro"during departmental

-3slow times ...." However that section pertains to "large vacation
accumulations" which I deem to be in excess of what the grievant
accumulated during or attendant to his one year employment.

Also

Section 6.1c contemplates the use of vacation entitlement as
actual time off from work.

In the instant case the issue is not

whether the grievant is now entitled to additional time off but
whether he should receive payment in liquidation of his vacation
rights.

Section 6.le gives a priority for the selection of the

vacation period to the employee.

But again, in my view, it deals

with a period of time away from active employment.

That is why

it accords a preference to the employee's choice of vacation
period "to the extent possible, consistent with a department's
work load."

In the instant case the grievant is not seeking a

vacation period; he is not seeking additional time off subsequent to the end of his active employment term, but rather pay
in lieu thereof.

Hence I do not find Section 6.le applicable.

Section 6.If appears more relevant to the instant circumstances.
It reads:
If an employee's service is terminated
for any reason, the employee (or the
employee's estate if deceased) shall be
entitled to receive full pay for each
unused vacation day up to 44 days.
However upon a closer reading, I conclude that this section
is also inapplicable.

The grievant"s service was not terminated.

On the contrary it was fully completed, i.e. he completed and
fulfilled his one year assignment in accordance with the period
of employment agreed to when he was hired.

In my opinion the

word "terminated" in 6.If applies to an unexpected, precipitious,
end to or shortening of what otherwise would have been a longer

-4period of employment.

Hence the example referred to, namely an

employee's death and the consequent entitlement of his estate.
It would also apply if an employee was discharge or if his employment term was involuntarily shortened for other comparable
reasons.

But that is not the facts in the instant case.

For the foregoing reasons I conclude that none of the cited
or relied upon provisions of Article 6 provide an answer to the
instant grievance.

Under that circumstance what remains as

applicable and dispositive is Article 3 (Board Prerogatives).
In pertinent part Section 3.2 provides:
The ability to determine, to make rules
for, or to approve such things as....
vacations .... shall be under the sole
jurisdiction of the Board of Trustees;
and
Section 3.3 provides in pertinent part:
These rights, responsibilities and prerogatives .... shall not be exercised in
a manner inconsistent or in violation of
any of the specific terms and provisions
of this Agreement ....
AsvI have concluded that none of the cited sections of
Article 6 are applicable to the facts in the instant case, there
is no specific term or provision of the Agreement which was
violated when the University scheduled the grievant to take his
vacation during the last two months of his one year period of
employment.

Therefore that determination or requirement by the

University was an exercise of its right "to determine and make
rules for vacations" in accordance with its stipulated prerogatives under Article 3.
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The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above named parties makes the following
AWARD:
The Union's grievance dated November
26, 1979 is arbitrable. The grievance
is denied.

DATED: October 31, 1980
Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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and
The University of New Haven

In accordance with Article 19 of the collective bargaining
agreement effective September 1, 1976 between the above named
Union and University, the Undersigned was designated as the
Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Did the University violate the collective
bargaining agreement (Article 5 (a) and Bylaw (3) by notifying Mr. Edwin Pearson
that his 1979-1980 contract was a terminal
contract ?
A hearing was held at the University in West Haven,
Connecticut on February 25, 1980 at which time representatives
of the Union and University appeared and were afforded a full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was taken.

PERTINENT CONTRACT PROVISIONS
The pertinent contractual provisions are:
Article 5: LETTERS OF NON-REAPPOINTMENT
LETTERS OF INTENT, AND CONTRACT LETTERS
Annual Letters of Non-Reappointment
(a) Annual letters of non-Reappointment for
each contract year shall be sent to the faculty
according to the schedule provided for in Bylaw
3 on Tenure and Promotion of the Faculty Constitution in effect June 1975-1976>*

-2*Bylaw (3) three: Tenure and Promotion provides, p.3 that Letters of Non-Reappointment
shall be sent out according to the following
schedule:
"First year Faculty shall be notified of reappointment status no later than March 1.
After one year of service reappointment status
shall be made known by December 1.
After two years of service, any decision not
to reappoint shall be communicated a full
calendar year in advance of appointment expiration. "
CONTENTIONS OF THE UNION
The University notified Mr. Edwin Pearson, hereinafter referred to as the grievant, in a letter dated May 9, 1979, that
his contract for the academic year 1979-1980 would be a terminal
contract.

The Union contends that the grievant who had served

in excess of two years did not receive notification of non-reappointment a full calendar
expiration0

year in advance of appointment

The Union argues that a full calendar

year referred

to in the contract is synonymous with the dictionary meaning,
namely from January through December.,

As a result, the Union

asserts that the University should have notified the grievant
prior to December 31, 1978 of his non-reappointment.
CONTENTIONS OF THE UNIVERSITY
The University's position is that a "calendar year" within
the meaning of the contract is a twelve-month period of time but
that it need not conform to the period January through December.
Instead, the University maintains that it fulfilled the requirements of the collective bargaining agreement by notifying the

-3grievant of the non-reappointment one full year prior to the end
of the grievant's academic year.

Specifically, the University

stresses the fact that the grievant received notice more than a
year early, in a letter dated May 9, 1979.

This is consistent

with the University's interpretation of the agreement which is
that May 31, 1979 was the cut-off date for providing timely notice
of non-reappointment to an academic year commencing after May 31,
1980.

With respect to the measurement of time to be applied, the

University stated that in academia, employment runs from September
to May although monetary payments are made over the twelve-month
period from September to August.

It argues that the Union's

position does not make sense because notice of non-reappointment
by the December 31 date would result in terminations effective on
December 31 a date which coincides with the middle of the academic
year0

And that that would be operationally impractical, unfair

to the employee involved because other teaching jobs are unavailable at that time of year, and therefore was not intended.
The University presented documents concerning five cases
that it asserts constitute evidence of a past practice under which
one calendar year is shown to mean a twelve-month period.
Exhibit
Number
5(a)
5(b)

Name of
Employee
Rainish
Ferringer

Date of
Notification
April 28, 1978
April 18, 1978

Last Academic Year
to be Worked
1978-1979
1978-1979

5(c)
5(d)

Sandman
Haberman

December 23, 1976
May 28, 1976

1976-1977
1976-1977

5(e)

Fryer

January 8, 1980

1980-1981

-4DISCUSSION
The arbitrator is bound to the clear language of the
collective bargaining agreement.
language to be clear.

I find the instant disputed

If the parties had intended to establish

the May 31 date as the last day for notification, they could have
so specified by reciting the May 31 date or by providing :that"any
decision not to reappoint shall be communicated twelve months
(or an academic year) in advance of appointment expiration."
The parties did not do so.

Rather, they used the term "calendar

year." Significantly the parties took pains to define "academic
year" and "contract year" in Article 4 of the contract and hence
knew how to use those phrases when and if they wished or intended
to do so.

Indeed in Article 5, the parties set forth specific

dates by which notices of intent to reappoint and annual contracts
are to be sent.

Significantly, "first year faculty" are to

be notified of reappointment status "no later than March 1st" and
"after one year of service reappointment status shall be made
known by December 1." (emphasis added)

So the parties knew well

how to use the terms "academic year", "contract year" and how to
use specific cut-off dates.

Yet, in the disputed clause, they

used none of these, but rather chose "calendar year."

I conclude

not only that they knew the plain or traditional meaning of
"calendar year" when they used it, but under the circumstances
meant it to carry that traditional meaning.
That the effect of this conclusion is that faculty members

-5who are not reappointed will be informed of the decision at least
17 months in advance is a reflection of the contract bargained,
and there is nothing about it which is unenforceable.

In fact

such a lengthy notice period is justified in the language of Bylaw 3 referred to in Article 5(a).

The Bylaws state that "any

delay in notification of Non-Reappointaent works a severe hardship
on faculty members, sometimes resulting in a full year of unemployment." Thus, the difficulty in securing another position after
notice of termination is an underlying rationale for as much
notice of non-reappointment as possible.

If, from the University's

standpoint this was not intended, or if more than 12 months is too
long a period of notice, a change is for collective bargaining,
not arbitration.
Requiring notice to be given by December 31 will not result j
in terminations becoming effective during the middle of the
academic year.

Although the University raised this conclusion as

the logical consequence of the Union's position, basic contract
law does not support it.

Each faculty member has an individual

employment contract that coincides with the academic year, running
until May 31st.

That employment contract is legally effective

for that time period irrespective of when notice of non-reappointment is given.

Hence, notice by December 31st would not disturb

or shorten an employment contract, which by its terms continued
until the following May 31st.
As to the contention of the University that a past practice
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exists that establishes May 31 as the cut-off date, I am unable
to find support in the evidence that the University presented.
First, the December 23, 1976 letter provides that: "University
policy on notification requires that I remind you that the contract
for the academic year 1977-1978 will be a terminal contract."
The timing of December 23 coupled with the language

concerning

"University policy" suggests that December 31 is the key date.
Second, the January 8, 1980 letter cannot be accorded probative
value as it arose during the pendency of if not after the instant
case and the Union's claim that it is unaware of this letter
stands unrefuted.

Third, the May 28, 1976 letter predates the

existence of the collective bargaining relationship between the
parties, and therefore, its substance and procedure cannot be
imputed to or deemed prejudicial to the Union0

There remain

two letters dated April 28, 1978 and April 18, 1978 respectively*
Even if I were to reject the Union's argument that (a) the April
28 letter is meaningless because the individual to whom it is
directed is still employed by the University; and (b) the April
18 letter is not a letter of non-reappointment,, two letters are
neither sufficient in quantity nor do they represent an unvaried
course of conduct over an extended period of time to meet the
definition of a "past practice."
The Union states that it does not seek any remedy in this
case other than an interpretation of the disputed contract
provisions.

Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons the
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contract language "calendar year" means the period January 1 to
December 31.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above named parties, makes the following
AWARD:
The University violated the collective
bargaining agreement (Article 5(a) and
Bylaw (3) by notifying Mr. Edwin Pearson
that his 1979-1980 contract was a terminal contract.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 3, 1980
STATE OF New York )sg .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this third day of March, 1980 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same0
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Windsor Education Association
and
Windsor Board of Education

The stipulated issue is:
Is the grievance arbitrable? If so,
did the Board of Education violate
the applicable provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement when
it assigned Ms. Judith Bleiler to a
unit II position at the Roger Walcott
School? If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Windsor, Connecticut on June 10, 1980
at which time Ms. Bleiler, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above named Association and
Board appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to

offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was duly administered.

In the course of the hearing the Arbitrator ruled that the
grievance met the contractual time limits and was arbitrable.
The collective bargaining agreement between the parties
makes no provision for the type of leave of absence for personal
reasons which the grievant requested and was granted in July of
1978 for the 1978-1979 school year.

The Board therefore is

correct when it asserts that it had no contractual obligation to
grant that leave of absence.

However it did grant it.

Having

done so, and as there were no explicit conditions attached to the
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grant of that leave, the Board is wrong when it asserts that it
has no obligation to reemploy the grievant upon the expiration of
the leave or to accord her any rights regarding her teaching
assignment upon her return.

In the absence of specific conditions

I consider it an implicit part of the leave of absence, on which
the grievant had logical and reasonable grounds to rely, that she
would have the same rights to reemployment and assignment as any
other teacher returning from a leave of absence authorized under
the collective bargaining agreement.

The Board has not shown to

my satisfaction that a contrary "Board policy" was either
explicitly promulgated or made known to the Association or the
grievant.
The letter of July 31, 1978 from the Superintendent of
Schools to the grievant grants the grievant's request for a leave
of absence and sets no relevant conditions on that leave.

It

merely states that she is "required to notify the Superintendent
of Schools in writing, no later than April 1, 1979, whether or not
you plan to return for the 1979-1980 school year."

Although the

grievant's reemployment is not at issue in this case, that statement is a clear indication of her right to reemployment provided
she gave notice as required!.
"

What is significant is that the letter

makes no mention whatsoever of the class, level and school to which
the grievant would be assigned upon her return from leave.

It is

that assignment which is in dispute in this case.
Prior to going on leave, the grievant was a unit I teacher
in the John Fitch School.

While she was on leave the Board
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notified her that upon her return she would be assigned to a unit
II position at the Roger Walcott School, and over her objection
was so assigned for and during the school year 1979-80.
It is my conclusion that under the particular circumstances
of this case the grievant was entitled to the same rights and
benefits as a teacher returning from sabbatical leave and maternity
leave, upon her return from the one year personal leave of absence.
Under the contract, (Article 15) a teacher returning from sabbatical
leave:
"shall be restored to his teacher position
or to a position of like nature insofar as
is possible."
Under Article 17 of the contract, a teacher returning from
maternity leave of absence shall be reinstated:
"to the original or an equivalent position
if available...."
As I have held, in the absence of explicit different conditions,
the grievant had the right to believe that her status upon return
from personal leave would be no less than that accorded a teacher
returning from sabbatical or maternity leave.
At the beginning of the 1979-80 school year the position
from which the grievant went on leave was available in the school
where she had taught before her leave commenced.
ing position existed in the John Fitch School.

A unit I teachIndeed, the very

position which the grievant left was occupied by the teacher who
had been assigned that position as her replacement during the
grievant's one year leave of absence.

I see no reason why the

grievant could not have been reassigned to her original position
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at her original school, and her replacement transferred to the
available teaching position at the Roger Walcott School.

Or if

the latter transfer was not administratively or pedagogically
feasible, other adjustments could and should have been made so
that the grievant could have been given the same reassignment
rights as an employee returning from a contractual leave of absence.
I conclude that her restoration to her original position was
"possible" within the meaning of that contract term.
I deem that at the beginning of the 1979-80 school year a
unit I position was "available" at the John Fitch School within
the meaning of that contract term.

I reject the Board's argument

that an "available" position is one which is vacant.

That inter-

pretation is unreasonable in that it is most unlikely that a
teaching position will be left vacant during the year that its
prior incumbent is on any kind of a leave, whether it be sabbatical,
maternity or personal.

Rather, it is to be expected that the

position would be filled and covered by a replacement.

Therefore,

a position that is "available" is a position which exists whether
vacant or not.

In the instant case the unit I position at the John

Fitch School from which the grievant took her leave of absence
existed.

It was occupied and covered by a replacement and was to

be actively worked during that school year.

It should have been

assigned to the grievant upon her return from her leave of absence.
The Board's failure to grant the grievant reassignment to
a unit I position in the John Fitch School for the year 1979-80
cannot of course be retroactively remedied.

The proper remedy in
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this case is to give her that teaching assignment prospectively
for the upcoming school year 1980-81.

Though there has been a

reduction in the number of available unit I positions at the John
Fitch School beginning this coming September, some such positions
exist.

If the grievant has sufficient seniority she shall be

assigned thereto for the upcoming year.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations makes the following AWARD:
The grievance is arbitrable.
The Board of Education violated the
collective bargaining agreement when
it assigned Ms. Judith Bleiler to a
unit II position at the Roger Walcott
School. Beginning in September 1980,
and for the school year 1980-81 Ms.
Bleiler shall be assigned to a unit I
teaching position at the John Fitch
School provided she has sufficient
seniority to claim one of such existing
positions, even if it means displacing
a teacher so assigned who has less
seniority.

DATED: July 21, 1980

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

